👁️Sauron's Plans & Númenórean populations

[Ugluk]

I'm pretty sure pre-gunpowder weapons had miltiple cases to be used as anti-moving targets, such as personnel, such as Romans's scorpions, Song dynasty's arcuballista, Alexendar's catapults or ballistas during his campiagns against Schytia, and so on. In addition, Numenor did have gunpowder weapons such as MLRS, correct me if I'm mistaken. To sum up, might Numenor have naval anti-personnel arty?

Oh, at the time, definitely. But ramming fell out of use as the ship construction changed from hull-first to ribs-first construction, which was far sturdier. In fact, I believe even late Roman navy may have abandoned ramming in favor of boarding.

"Ramming" was still used though... for boarding purposes. Later galleys had a boarding platform at the prow - much more practical than the corvus - and they would ram the enemy ship with it to allow the boarders to cross.

As I understand it, ramming well out of favour earlier, as by the Hellenistic period heavy projectile weapons meant that the rammer was more likely to be disabled by the rammed before it was actually rammed. Projectile weapons needed large, stable platforms for accuracy, and crews to match. The Mediterranean becoming a roman lake after the defeat of the Ptolemies meant that such large ships (and their heavy armament) were no longer needed, smaller ships, relying on boarding became more effective for the anti-piracy tasks. The heavy, non gunpowder projectile weapons do not seem to have been reinvented in the Byzantine and Islamic periods

 

[Olorgando]

Oh, at the time, definitely. But ramming fell out of use as the ship construction changed from hull-first to ribs-first construction, which was far sturdier. In fact, I believe even late Roman navy may have abandoned ramming in favor of boarding.
"Ramming" was still used though... for boarding purposes. Later galleys had a boarding platform at the prow - much more practical than the corvus - and they would ram the enemy ship with it to allow the boarders to cross.

At least as a secondary, more likely tertiary option, ramming remained even into the era of iron- or steel-constructed ship up to the "Dreadnought"-era. That's why the prows, in contrast to the clipper-ship-like raked bows of later warships (from the 1930's on?) were longer at the water line than at the main deck. Even the lead ship of the "all-big-gun" battleships, the HMS Dreadnought of 1906, still showed this bow form. In fact, the first capital ship of the Royal Navy with a somewhat raked bow might have been the battle cruiser HMS "Hood" of 1920. As per my 1997 German translation of the 1996 HarperCollins book "Jane's Battleships of the Twentieth Century", the bow form probably owed more to hydrodynamic considerations and certainly wasn't chosen with the view to ramming an opponent - the range of the main artillery had reached distances at which opponents could only be made out by huge optical targeting systems, or later, especially useful in bad weather obscuring optical systems, by radar.

 

[Aldarion]

At least as a secondary, more likely tertiary option, ramming remained even into the era of iron- or steel-constructed ship up to the "Dreadnought"-era. That's why the prows, in contrast to the clipper-ship-like raked bows of later warships (from the 1930's on?) were longer at the water line than at the main deck. Even the lead ship of the "all-big-gun" battleships, the HMS Dreadnought of 1906, still showed this bow form. In fact, the first capital ship of the Royal Navy with a somewhat raked bow might have been the battle cruiser HMS "Hood" of 1920. As per my 1997 German translation of the 1996 HarperCollins book "Jane's Battleships of the Twentieth Century", the bow form probably owed more to hydrodynamic considerations and certainly wasn't chosen with the view to ramming an opponent - the range of the main artillery had reached distances at which opponents could only be made out by huge optical targeting systems, or later, especially useful in bad weather obscuring optical systems, by radar.

It did not "remain". Rather, it came back. During the Middle Ages, as I said, ramming was still used in galley warfare, but only for the purposes of boarding, not of trying to sink ships. Byzantine dromonds had a raised prow for boarding, and we see ramming-to-board being used as late as the Battle of Lepanto in 1571. But in the Atlantic, where cogs and later caravels and carracks were used (galleys not being all that suitable for oceanic warfare), boarding was done by bringing ships alongside each other and using grappling hooks. As artillery advanced, boarding became ever rarer, and by the 17th century warships largely did away with the towers that were used to provide elevated platforms to support marines, gradually transitioning into artillery-primary ships of the line and similar gun warships. This process happened in the Mediterranean too, though it took slightly longer.

This artillery focus would remain for a long time. Boarding actions still happened with regularity - many goood examples at the Battle of Trafalgar! - but it was rarely decisive and never the first option. Battle was typically won or lost in a cannon duel, with boarding - if it happened at all - being merely a formal seal on the already decided outcome. This would only change with appearance of ironclads (Nemesis, 1839). But it was only in late 1850s that ironclads began appearing in numbers along with appearance of ocean-going ironclads (Gloire, 1857) and by 1862, ironclads had been adapted en-masse by European navies. Year of 1862 also marked the first appearance of ironclads in the US as well as the first ironclad-on-ironclad battle (CSS Virginia vs USS Monitor, 1862).

For a period of time, armor had significant advantage over the available artillery. USS Monitor and CSS Virginia spent hours pounding each other into scrap metal... with only success being creating a lot of noise. Neither could sink each other: Monitor had no ramming beak, and Virginia had left her own in the side of USS Cumberland, and in any case was about as agile as a beached whale. This impotence of artillery was seemingly confirmed in the Battle of Vis in 1866, where even wooden warships managed to stand up to modern guns, though with significant damage. Battle of Vis was the first (and I believe last) major naval battle between ironclad warships, and also the first naval battle of modernity to feature numerous cases of deliberate ramming. Reason was simple: armor of the time made naval artillery nearly useless, and so ramming and boarding were the only viable options for taking out enemy ironclads. Austrian flagship Erzherzog Ferdinand Max rammed and sank Italian ironclad and de-iure flagship Re d'Italia and also rammed Palestro, which later exploded as a result of fire onboard caused by artillery fire from armored frigate Drache.

This battle seemingly confirmed importance of ramming, and battleships for a long time continued to be built with a ramming prow, causing some rather hilarious incidents. By the late 19th century however improvements in gunnery meant that warships did away with actual rams. Ramming prow profile remained however as it was discovered that the ram had acted much like bulbous bow does in modern ships, significantly decreasing water resistance at speed. Looking at profile of HMS Dreadnought, it is clear that she did not actually have a ram: ramming bow form was there for reasons of hydrodynamics, not tactics.

As I understand it, ramming well out of favour earlier, as by the Hellenistic period heavy projectile weapons meant that the rammer was more likely to be disabled by the rammed before it was actually rammed. Projectile weapons needed large, stable platforms for accuracy, and crews to match. The Mediterranean becoming a roman lake after the defeat of the Ptolemies meant that such large ships (and their heavy armament) were no longer needed, smaller ships, relying on boarding became more effective for the anti-piracy tasks. The heavy, non gunpowder projectile weapons do not seem to have been reinvented in the Byzantine and Islamic periods

Depends on where. Carthaginians certainly focused heavily on ramming, otherwise Roman corvus will not have been as successful as it apparently was. In Battle of Aegatas in 241 BC, Romans defeated Carthaginians through successful ramming attacks, whereas Roman Civil War Battles of Mylae and of Naulochus in 36 BC were decided by boarding.

Rather than artillery, my quick reading would suggest that it were grappling hooks (which technically could count as a form of artillery, being deployed from ballistae) were what brought the end to primacy of ramming in naval warfare, at least in Roman times. If so, then there will have been little difference between late Republican, Imperial and Byzantine naval tactics, all of them being focused on boarding.

 

[Ugluk]

At least as a secondary, more likely tertiary option, ramming remained even into the era of iron- or steel-constructed ship up to the "Dreadnought"-era. That's why the prows, in contrast to the clipper-ship-like raked bows of later warships (from the 1930's on?) were longer at the water line than at the main deck. Even the lead ship of the "all-big-gun" battleships, the HMS Dreadnought of 1906, still showed this bow form. In fact, the first capital ship of the Royal Navy with a somewhat raked bow might have been the battle cruiser HMS "Hood" of 1920. As per my 1997 German translation of the 1996 HarperCollins book "Jane's Battleships of the Twentieth Century", the bow form probably owed more to hydrodynamic considerations and certainly wasn't chosen with the view to ramming an opponent - the range of the main artillery had reached distances at which opponents could only be made out by huge optical targeting systems, or later, especially useful in bad weather obscuring optical systems, by radar.

Dreadnought did sink U-29 by ramming, the only submarine sunk by a battleship. Many WWI and WWII escorts and some larger ships were fitted by strengthened bows as ramming was a common method to deliver the coup the grace to surfaced submarines.

 

[Hisoka Morrow]

You guys let me recall possibly the most splendid records of ramming warfare-Battle of the Philippine Sea in WWII, where the US Navy destroyers rammed Japs Dreadnought or carriers, correct me if I'm wrong.
In fact, in the era of "gun-arty-domain naval warfare era" between the 17th century and WWII, ramming would still be destructive seomtimes, such as the suicide attack in the Sino-Japan War in 1894, led by Admiral Deng-Shi-Chang, even if it might be destructive just on the aspect on psyco. After all, the clashes of engines led by warships ramming is a "Allahu Akbar" or "Tenno Heikai Banzai". (No offense to Muslim or Japanese)

 

[Ent]

correct me if I'm wrong.

Dunno yet.

Haven't found where one of her dreadnought class vessels was sunk by ramming. Yamato, Japan's largest ever ship (having only a 2nd, the 'Musaka' or somethi8ng like that, in its class ever built), was sunk by relentless aircraft torpedoing, carefully planned and executed.

 

[Olorgando]

You guys let me recall possibly the most splendid records of ramming warfare-Battle of the Philippine Sea in WWII, where the US Navy destroyers rammed Japs Dreadnought or carriers, correct me if I'm wrong.

You are. The Battle of the Philippine Sea was the largest aircraft carrier vs. aircraft carrier (plus on the Japanese side island-based aircraft) battle of all time. The Japanese lost three fleet carriers - two to submarine attacks - and nearly all of their navy pilots. This was in part due to the Japanese pilots being inexperienced, as they had lost most of their experienced pilots in the two previous year, including the disaster (from a Japanese viewpoint) of the Battle of Midway. The Battle of the Philippine Sea effectively destroyed the Japanese fleet air arm, both in terms of fleet aircraft carriers as well as in aircraft and pilots. Nothing about ramming here, the opposing fleets were several times more distant from each other than the maximum gunnery range of the most powerful battleship artillery.

@Ent : that second Yamato-class battleship was the "Musashi", which was destroyed by US carrier aircraft about four months after the Battle of the Philippine Sea, in the Battle of Leyte Gulf during the US invasion of the Philippines in October 1944.

 

[Ent]

"Musashi",

Thanks for the clarification and info on the demise of the 'sister ship'.
I read a little on the planning for the demise of the Yamato...pretty interesting stuff. It was a ship to be reckoned with... and it was.

We often think of planes as just flying in, dropping bombs and launching torpedoes, and that's about it. Not sure how many of us are familiar with the coreographing going into exactly how to bring a well-built ship down.

And I do believe every age in history has had its ships needing special consideration to bring to their end...including today, making warfare continue to be attractive to some for the technical and tactical satisfaction, as well as its other many attributes.

 

[Aldarion]

You are. The Battle of the Philippine Sea was the largest aircraft carrier vs. aircraft carrier (plus on the Japanese side island-based aircraft) of all time. The Japanese lost three fleet carriers - two to submarine attacks - and nearly all of their navy pilots. This was in part due to the Japanese pilots being inexperienced, as they had lost most of their experienced pilots in the two previous year, including the disaster (from a Japanese viewpoint) of the Battle of Midway. The Battle of the Philippine Sea effectively destroyed the Japanese fleet air arm, both in terms of fleet aircraft carriers as well as in aircraft and pilots. Nothing about ramming here, the opposing fleets were several times more distant from each other than the maximum gunnery range of the most powerful battleship artillery.

@Ent : that second Yamato-class battleship was the "Musashi", which was destroyed by US carrier aircraft about four months after the Battle of the Philippine Sea, in the Battle of Leyte Gulf during the US invasion of the Philippines in October 1944.

You guys let me recall possibly the most splendid records of ramming warfare-Battle of the Philippine Sea in WWII, where the US Navy destroyers rammed Japs Dreadnought or carriers, correct me if I'm wrong.
In fact, in the era of "gun-arty-domain naval warfare era" between the 17th century and WWII, ramming would still be destructive seomtimes, such as the suicide attack in the Sino-Japan War in 1894, led by Admiral Deng-Shi-Chang, even if it might be destructive just on the aspect on psyco. After all, the clashes of engines led by warships ramming is a "Allahu Akbar" or "Tenno Heikai Banzai". (No offense to Muslim or Japanese)

Both of you are wrong, in fact. The Battle of the Philippine Sea saw several engagements. All three Japanese battleship forces actually reached the gunnery range of their opponents. Squadron of Vice Admiral Nishimura was ambushed and destroyed in a close-range gunnery engagement by old battleships of Jesse Oldendorf (though battleship Fuso was sank earlier by destroyer torpedoes). Heavy cruisers Yamashiro and Mogami were also sunk by battleship fire. Squadron of Vice Admiral Shima, arriving later, saw what happened to Nishimura's squadron and thus decided to wisely scamper, losing only light cruiser Abukuma and a single destroyer.

Main Japanese battleship force, the central force under admiral Kurita, had indeed been mauled by aircraft and began to retreat. But as so often in warfare, fog of war and wishful thinking combined to create impression of far greater damage done than was really the case. This led Admiral Halsey to abandon his plan of forming the "34th Squadron", which was to have four (or six?) fast battleships, two heavy cruisers, 3 light cruisers and two destroyer flotillas and was to protect the San Bernardino strait. Halsey instead concluded that Kurita's squadron had been rendered combat-ineffective by air attacks and thus presented no further threat to the landing forces. As a result, Halsey took the 34th Squadron along on his merry chase after Japanese carriers.

So when Kurita turned around for another attempt at passing the strait, the strait was completely unguarded. Admiral Kinkaid's Seventh Fleet had been out of position to do anything and in any case had spent much of its ammunition and fuel mauling Nishimura's squadron. Halsey had ignored both Kinkaid's pleas for help and reports of his own scouts that Kurita had indeed turned around, and instead focused on destroying the Japanese carriers. Escort carriers that had been left in the Leyte Gulf had only lightweight high explosive bombs designed for attacks on ground targets, and could not seriously damage Japanese warships.

But Clifton Sprague's Taffy 3 offered resistance far beyond what Japanese could have expected of an escort force, with many Japanese warships damaged by air attacks as well as by torpedo attacks made by Taffy 3's escort destroyers. Even escort carriers themselves engaged with their singular 5 in gun mounts. Escort carrier Gambier Bay was eventually sunk by battleship Yamato. Yet due to heavy resistance Kurita apparently concluded that he was facing the US fleet carriers instead of meagre escort force and that it was only a matter of time before he was surrounded and destroyed.

All and all, surface action was heavy. While I do not recall anything about ramming during the Battle of the Philippine sea, it is not inconcievable that ramming attempts may have been made. After all, at some points, distances between warships of two sides could be measured in hundreds of yards.

 

[Olorgando]

Both of you are wrong, in fact. The Battle of the Philippine Sea saw several engagements. All three Japanese battleship forces actually reached the gunnery range of their opponents. Squadron of Vice Admiral Nishimura was ambushed and destroyed in a close-range gunnery engagement by old battleships of Jesse Oldendorf (though battleship Fuso was sank earlier by destroyer torpedoes). Heavy cruisers Yamashiro and Mogami were also sunk by battleship fire. Squadron of Vice Admiral Shima, arriving later, saw what happened to Nishimura's squadron and thus decided to wisely scamper, losing only light cruiser Abukuma and a single destroyer.

Main Japanese battleship force, the central force under admiral Kurita, had indeed been mauled by aircraft and began to retreat. But as so often in warfare, fog of war and wishful thinking combined to create impression of far greater damage done than was really the case. This led Admiral Halsey to abandon his plan of forming the "34th Squadron", which was to have four (or six?) fast battleships, two heavy cruisers, 3 light cruisers and two destroyer flotillas and was to protect the San Bernardino strait. Halsey instead concluded that Kurita's squadron had been rendered combat-ineffective by air attacks and thus presented no further threat to the landing forces. As a result, Halsey took the 34th Squadron along on his merry chase after Japanese carriers.

So when Kurita turned around for another attempt at passing the strait, the strait was completely unguarded. Admiral Kinkaid's Seventh Fleet had been out of position to do anything and in any case had spent much of its ammunition and fuel mauling Nishimura's squadron. Halsey had ignored both Kinkaid's pleas for help and reports of his own scouts that Kurita had indeed turned around, and instead focused on destroying the Japanese carriers. Escort carriers that had been left in the Leyte Gulf had only lightweight high explosive bombs designed for attacks on ground targets, and could not seriously damage Japanese warships.

But Clifton Sprague's Taffy 3 offered resistance far beyond what Japanese could have expected of an escort force, with many Japanese warships damaged by air attacks as well as by torpedo attacks made by Taffy 3's escort destroyers. Even escort carriers themselves engaged with their singular 5 in gun mounts. Escort carrier Gambier Bay was eventually sunk by battleship Yamato. Yet due to heavy resistance Kurita apparently concluded that he was facing the US fleet carriers instead of meagre escort force and that it was only a matter of time before he was surrounded and destroyed.

All and all, surface action was heavy. While I do not recall anything about ramming during the Battle of the Philippine sea, it is not inconcievable that ramming attempts may have been made. After all, at some points, distances between warships of two sides could be measured in hundreds of yards.

No, Aldarion, this time you're definitely wrong. What you describe is precisely the battle of Leyte Gulf in October 1944, the overall name given to several engagements in the region, during the US invasion of the Philippines, specifically the centrally located island of Leyte.
The Battle of the Philippine Sea took place in June 1944, when the US invaded the Mariana Islands a good deal east of the Philippines. US naval pilots also called it the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot, as they shot down the (mostly) inexperienced Japanese pilots by an extremely lopsided ratio (anti-aircraft gunnery also took a heavy toll).

 

[Aldarion]

No, Aldarion, this time you're definitely wrong. What you describe is precisely the battle of Leyte Gulf in October 1944, the overall name given to several engagements in the region, during the US invasion of the Philippines, specifically the centrally located island of Leyte.
The Battle of the Philippine Sea took place in June 1944, when the US invaded the Mariana Islands a good deal east of the Philippines. US naval pilots also called it the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot, as they shot down the (mostly) inexperienced Japanese pilots by an extremely lopsided ratio (anti-aircraft gunnery also took a heavy toll).

Right.

I always knew it as Battle of Marianas, so the Philippine Sea bit confused me.

 

[Hisoka Morrow]

No, Aldarion, this time you're definitely wrong. What you describe is precisely the battle of Leyte Gulf in October 1944, the overall name given to several engagements in the region, during the US invasion of the Philippines, specifically the centrally located island of Leyte.
The Battle of the Philippine Sea took place in June 1944, when the US invaded the Mariana Islands a good deal east of the Philippines. US naval pilots also called it the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot, as they shot down the (mostly) inexperienced Japanese pilots by an extremely lopsided ratio (anti-aircraft gunnery also took a heavy toll).

Oooppsss, I thought they should be considered into the same campaign, or one of them should be merged into the other among them.

 

[Hisoka Morrow]

Boarding could have been done by ramming - that is the reason why Mediterranean galleys had that pronounced prow, it was a boarding platform - but considering that coasts of Gondor faced ocean, I always saw their ships as being more akin to large longships. These also did boarding actions, but mostly by coming alongside the enemy and grappling him with hooks.

Would Gondor have dealt with Umbar in naval combat? Ramming may have shown up then, though just for boarding purposes (by the sound of it) since their ships would have been sturdy.

Maybe here's a little difference between ramming and boarding, shown by the case of Aragorn's assult at Umbar, composed of infiltration and early-special-forces tactics, a bit similiar with Japs commandos assualt at port Lu Shan the in the Russo-Japan war, and as this might be the only detailed amphibious and naval combat recorded by JRRT, at least, latter Gondor naval and amphibious warfare did not exclude, as their main methods to inflict casualties were mainly explosive instead of ramming.
In addition, regular military purposes for Gondor navy and marines might also have annihilating-personnel as the most prior, as the case mentioned above showed that Aragorn only conducted "kill them all" orders. The only naval-hardware capturing mission shown by JRRT might only be the Army Dead's operatiion against the pirates, and it's another obvious case showing "boarding instead of ramming". As naval perssonel seemed to be the most prior targets instead of hardware of Gondor military stretagy, ramming seemed not to have high chances to appear in JRRT's lore's Gondor navy.
Correct me if I'm worng.