LawOfTheRings
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Gandalf v. Pippin Prompt
The estate of Gandalf sued Peregrin Took in Rivendell Court for negligence following an incident in Moria.
The Fellowship of the Ring was in a tomb in the mines of Moria, which was known to be overrun by vicious orcs. Gandalf, the leader of the Fellowship, was busy reading a book he found when suddenly Pippin poked a metal-clad skeleton precariously-perched on the edge of a long well-shaft stretching deeper into the mines. Upon poking, the skeleton tipped and fell down the shaft, causing echoing bangs and clatters all throughout Moria. Gandalf exclaimed âFool of a Took!â Moments later, drums sounded in the deepâthe orcs were coming! As the Fellowship ran from the orcs, they were surprised to find a Balrog of Morgoth pursuing them as well. Gandalf took the rear-guard, standing firm while the rest of the Fellowship retreated. There Gandalf was slain fighting the Balrog.
Analyze all negligence claims the estate of Gandalf may have against Peregrin Took and all of Pippinâs possible defenses.
Answer
In order for the estate of Gandalf to prove a negligence claim, Gandalf must show that (1) Pippin had a duty of care towards Gandalf that (2) he breached, which (3) proximately caused in fact (4) Gandalfâs injuries.
Duty & Breach
Did Pippin breach a duty of care towards Gandalf? Duty is defined as the caution a reasonably prudent person would exercise so as not to put at risk those in the foreseeable zone of danger. In addition, another helpful test of duty is B<PL analysis, which dictates that as long as the burden of the duty is less than the product of the probability of harm times the damage of the harm, then that duty should be exercised. Generally speaking, one has no affirmative duty to act to help or save someone unless one created the risk, has a special relationship toward the plaintiff, voluntarily assumed the risk, or under the take charge rule.
Here, a reasonably prudent person would know to keep quiet in the mine of Moria due to the foreseeable danger of orcs. A reasonably prudent person would therefore notice the metal armor on the precariously-perched skeleton and foresee the noise it could cause if it falls. The noise would put the rest of the Fellowship, which included Gandalf, in a foreseeable zone of danger from the orcs alerted to their presence. This suggests Pippin had a duty of care towards Gandalf. In addition, according to B<PL analysis, the probability of harm occurring is high if loud noises alert the orcs. In addition, the harm itself would be significant because they risk severe injury and death from orc attack. In contrast, the burden of keeping quiet is relatively low: especially so when all that is required is an omission of a poke. Thus, because Pippinâs burden of refraining from poking the skeleton was so low, compared to the very high probability of severe harm to Gandalf, Pippin had a duty of care towards Gandalf to refrain from poking the skeleton.
Instead, fool of a Took that he was, Pippin breached his duty of care by poking the skeleton.
Defenses
Pippin might argue that he didnât know what would happen when he poked the skeleton. Thus, he had no duty because he could not foresee the zone of danger he might cause. But this argument is unlikely to prevail because stupidity is not a defense to negligence. The RPP standard is not an average that half of the population is too stupid to meet but a baseline all members, absent exceptional circumstances such as physical disability, should follow. Thus lack of knowledge is not a defense for Pippin, assuming a reasonably prudent person would foresee the zone of danger.
Pippin might argue that Gandalf was comparatively or contributorily negligent because he had an affirmative duty to save Pippin from the danger of poking the skeleton. Comparative negligence pure reduces the plaintiffâs recovery by the percentage that their negligence also contributed to their injury. Two forms of comparative negligence modified say either that the plaintiff must be 50% or less at fault to recover or 49% or less at fault to recover. Finally, slight comparative negligence requires the plaintiffâs negligence to be slight compared to the defendantâs in order to recover. On the other hand, contributory negligence is a total bar to plaintiff recovery if the plaintiff is at all negligent in any way in the incident. A minority form of contributory negligence says the plaintiff may still recover even if they are negligent so long as the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the plaintiffâs injury.
Affirmative duty to act arises from special relationships, like parent and child, airline and passenger, school and schoolchildren.
Here, because Gandalf was the leader of the Fellowship, he had a special relationship with the Fellowship that translates into an affirmative duty to act to save its members, such as Pippin, from foreseeable dangers, such as poking the skeleton. However, although this argument makes sense on its face, it is unlikely to prevail due to B<PL analysis. Assuming a reasonable person would obviously not poke the skeleton, Pippin poking the skeleton was highly unlikely and unforeseeable. If Gandalf must take affirmative action to babysit Pippin from all such unlikely and unforeseeable stupidities, the burden would be intolerably high. Although in dangerous places the probability of serious harm is also high, Gandalf must tend to the entire party, not only to Pippin. Placing such a heavy burden on Gandalf to babysit Pippin would lead to an imbalance of risk and endanger the entire party. Thus Pippinâs argument that Gandalf was negligent by not babysitting his every move fails B<PL analysis because it would lead to an intolerable burden and increased probability of danger to the Fellowship. This analysis likely means that Gandalf was not negligent at all when he was reading the book: he could not foresee sheer stupidity on the part of Pippin and thus owed no duty to babysit his exploration of the tomb, thereby committing no negligence in that moment. Thus, no matter what kind of jurisdiction Rivendell is, whether comparative or contributory or any of its subparts, Gandalf could still recover.
Causation
Was Pippinâs breach of duty a cause in fact and proximately of Gandalfâs injuries? Causation is satisfied if it is both an in fact cause of damages, as well as a proximate one. In fact causation asks âBut for the defendantâs breach of duty, would the plaintiff have been injured?â Proximate cause asks, âWould a reasonably prudent person in the shoes of the defendant at the time of the breach of duty foresee the type of harm the plaintiff suffered?â Importantly, to satisfy proximate cause, the reasonably prudent person must only foresee the type of harm the plaintiff suffered, not the manner of harm.
Here, had Pippin not poked the skeleton, the orcs would not have been alerted; the Balrog would not have followed after the orcs; and Gandalf would not have fallen. But for Pippinâs breach of duty by poking the skeleton, Gandalf would not have been slain. Thus, Pippinâs breach of duty was an in fact cause of Gandalfâs injuries.
But was Pippinâs breach of duty a proximate cause of Gandalfâs injuries? Here, a reasonably prudent person in Pippinâs shoes at the time of poking the skeleton would foresee combat injuries and possibly death. Because Gandalf suffered combat injuries from the Balrog up to and including death, a reasonably prudent person in Pippinâs shoes would foresee the type of harm Gandalf suffered. Therefore Pippinâs breach of duty was a proximate cause of Gandalfâs death.
Defenses
First, Pippin might argue that no one could have foreseen Gandalfâs death at the hands of a Balrog. After all, they were surprised at seeing the Balrog but knew about the danger of orcs. Therefore Pippinâs breach of duty was not a proximate cause of Gandalfâs death at the hands of a Balrog. But this argument is unlikely to prevail because proximate cause only requires foreseeability of the type of harm not the manner of harm. True, no one foresaw the manner of Gandalfâs death by a Balrog, but everyone could foresee the type of harm possibly occurring from Pippinâs breach of duty: namely, death in combat.
Second, Pippin might further argue that the Balrog and the Orcs were superceding causes of Gandalfâs injury. Superceding causes include acts of god (like freak weather) and criminal or intentional wrong-doing. Because the Balrog was an intentional wrong-doer, Pippin might argue that the Balrog was a superceding cause. But this argument is unlikely to prevail. Although it is true that criminal and intentional wrongdoing is generally unforeseeable, in special circumstances it is foreseeable, such as dangerous neighborhoods, or areas in which there are lots of criminals for example. Here, of course, the Fellowship knew it was in a dangerous area full of intentional wrongdoers, i.e., the orcs. A reasonably prudent person in the Fellowshipâs shoes could thus foresee intentional wrongdoing while in Moria if noise were created. Again, even though that intentional wrongdoing was from a Balrog (not an orc), we need only foresee the type, not the manner, of the harm done.
Third, Pippin might argue that Gandalf assumed the danger of death by Balrog because he chose to stand his ground and fight. Assumption of risk can be express or implied. Because Gandalf gave no express indication that he was staying behind but simply did so, we must analyze whether he gave implied consent to assume the risk. Implied assumption of risk asks if (1) the plaintiff actually knew of the risk, (2) the plaintiff knew of the magnitude of the risk, and (3) the plaintiff voluntarily accepted the risk. Here, Pippin would argue, Gandalf plainly knew of the risk of the Balrog because he was running from it. Second, Gandalf knew of the magnitude of the risk because he chose to stay back and allow the Fellowship to escapeâa choice that would not have been made absent knowledge that the magnitude of the risk included death to the whole Fellowship as it was trying to escape. Finally, Gandalf voluntarily accepted the risk because he chose to stay behind and fend off the Balrog. Thus, because Gandalf assumed the risk of death, Pippin is not liable for Gandalfâs injuries. But this argument is unlikely to prevail because it confuses assumption of risk before and after breach of duty. For example, if Gandalf had expressly said or implied that he assumed the risk of death by Balrog from the beginning of entering Moria, Pippinâs argument would be sound. But in fact, Gandalf and the rest of the Fellowship proceeded through Moria quietly and stealthily, suggesting that Gandalf did not consent to assume the risk of fighting a Balrog absent duress and force. Although on its face it appears Gandalf assumed the risk when he chose to stay behind, this choice was in fact under duress and by force because he would not have chosen it from the beginning but only as a last resort peril.
Damages
The plaintiff must have damages in fact and proximately resulting from the defendantâs breach of duty. Nominal damages do not count. Typically, these damages are compensatory, and are designed to compensate the plaintiff in full for the full damages caused by the defendant. These can take the form of hospital bills, property damage, or wrongful death claims from an estate. Lastly, there are also possible punitive damages, meant to punish the defendant not to compensate the plaintiffâs damages, but these are rare and are generally only awarded due to gross and wanton negligence or intentional wrongdoing.
Are there damages? Here, Gandalf was slain by the Balrog. His estate is likely filing a wrongful death claim, a serious but classic example of damages. In addition, there is a chance of punitive damages because it is possible to argue that Pippinâs negligence was gross and wanton given the obvious danger of noise resulting from poking the skeleton and the obvious danger of their environment. A jury of elves would likely be sympathetic with the estate of Gandalf because of his friendship with the elves and because of the gravity of the ensuing harm done. Thus, there is a small chance of punitive damages being awarded in addition to compensatory damages.
Conclusion
In conclusion, Pippin was negligent, and Gandalfâs estate can recover from Pippin for wrongful death.
The estate of Gandalf sued Peregrin Took in Rivendell Court for negligence following an incident in Moria.
The Fellowship of the Ring was in a tomb in the mines of Moria, which was known to be overrun by vicious orcs. Gandalf, the leader of the Fellowship, was busy reading a book he found when suddenly Pippin poked a metal-clad skeleton precariously-perched on the edge of a long well-shaft stretching deeper into the mines. Upon poking, the skeleton tipped and fell down the shaft, causing echoing bangs and clatters all throughout Moria. Gandalf exclaimed âFool of a Took!â Moments later, drums sounded in the deepâthe orcs were coming! As the Fellowship ran from the orcs, they were surprised to find a Balrog of Morgoth pursuing them as well. Gandalf took the rear-guard, standing firm while the rest of the Fellowship retreated. There Gandalf was slain fighting the Balrog.
Analyze all negligence claims the estate of Gandalf may have against Peregrin Took and all of Pippinâs possible defenses.
Answer
In order for the estate of Gandalf to prove a negligence claim, Gandalf must show that (1) Pippin had a duty of care towards Gandalf that (2) he breached, which (3) proximately caused in fact (4) Gandalfâs injuries.
Duty & Breach
Did Pippin breach a duty of care towards Gandalf? Duty is defined as the caution a reasonably prudent person would exercise so as not to put at risk those in the foreseeable zone of danger. In addition, another helpful test of duty is B<PL analysis, which dictates that as long as the burden of the duty is less than the product of the probability of harm times the damage of the harm, then that duty should be exercised. Generally speaking, one has no affirmative duty to act to help or save someone unless one created the risk, has a special relationship toward the plaintiff, voluntarily assumed the risk, or under the take charge rule.
Here, a reasonably prudent person would know to keep quiet in the mine of Moria due to the foreseeable danger of orcs. A reasonably prudent person would therefore notice the metal armor on the precariously-perched skeleton and foresee the noise it could cause if it falls. The noise would put the rest of the Fellowship, which included Gandalf, in a foreseeable zone of danger from the orcs alerted to their presence. This suggests Pippin had a duty of care towards Gandalf. In addition, according to B<PL analysis, the probability of harm occurring is high if loud noises alert the orcs. In addition, the harm itself would be significant because they risk severe injury and death from orc attack. In contrast, the burden of keeping quiet is relatively low: especially so when all that is required is an omission of a poke. Thus, because Pippinâs burden of refraining from poking the skeleton was so low, compared to the very high probability of severe harm to Gandalf, Pippin had a duty of care towards Gandalf to refrain from poking the skeleton.
Instead, fool of a Took that he was, Pippin breached his duty of care by poking the skeleton.
Defenses
Pippin might argue that he didnât know what would happen when he poked the skeleton. Thus, he had no duty because he could not foresee the zone of danger he might cause. But this argument is unlikely to prevail because stupidity is not a defense to negligence. The RPP standard is not an average that half of the population is too stupid to meet but a baseline all members, absent exceptional circumstances such as physical disability, should follow. Thus lack of knowledge is not a defense for Pippin, assuming a reasonably prudent person would foresee the zone of danger.
Pippin might argue that Gandalf was comparatively or contributorily negligent because he had an affirmative duty to save Pippin from the danger of poking the skeleton. Comparative negligence pure reduces the plaintiffâs recovery by the percentage that their negligence also contributed to their injury. Two forms of comparative negligence modified say either that the plaintiff must be 50% or less at fault to recover or 49% or less at fault to recover. Finally, slight comparative negligence requires the plaintiffâs negligence to be slight compared to the defendantâs in order to recover. On the other hand, contributory negligence is a total bar to plaintiff recovery if the plaintiff is at all negligent in any way in the incident. A minority form of contributory negligence says the plaintiff may still recover even if they are negligent so long as the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the plaintiffâs injury.
Affirmative duty to act arises from special relationships, like parent and child, airline and passenger, school and schoolchildren.
Here, because Gandalf was the leader of the Fellowship, he had a special relationship with the Fellowship that translates into an affirmative duty to act to save its members, such as Pippin, from foreseeable dangers, such as poking the skeleton. However, although this argument makes sense on its face, it is unlikely to prevail due to B<PL analysis. Assuming a reasonable person would obviously not poke the skeleton, Pippin poking the skeleton was highly unlikely and unforeseeable. If Gandalf must take affirmative action to babysit Pippin from all such unlikely and unforeseeable stupidities, the burden would be intolerably high. Although in dangerous places the probability of serious harm is also high, Gandalf must tend to the entire party, not only to Pippin. Placing such a heavy burden on Gandalf to babysit Pippin would lead to an imbalance of risk and endanger the entire party. Thus Pippinâs argument that Gandalf was negligent by not babysitting his every move fails B<PL analysis because it would lead to an intolerable burden and increased probability of danger to the Fellowship. This analysis likely means that Gandalf was not negligent at all when he was reading the book: he could not foresee sheer stupidity on the part of Pippin and thus owed no duty to babysit his exploration of the tomb, thereby committing no negligence in that moment. Thus, no matter what kind of jurisdiction Rivendell is, whether comparative or contributory or any of its subparts, Gandalf could still recover.
Causation
Was Pippinâs breach of duty a cause in fact and proximately of Gandalfâs injuries? Causation is satisfied if it is both an in fact cause of damages, as well as a proximate one. In fact causation asks âBut for the defendantâs breach of duty, would the plaintiff have been injured?â Proximate cause asks, âWould a reasonably prudent person in the shoes of the defendant at the time of the breach of duty foresee the type of harm the plaintiff suffered?â Importantly, to satisfy proximate cause, the reasonably prudent person must only foresee the type of harm the plaintiff suffered, not the manner of harm.
Here, had Pippin not poked the skeleton, the orcs would not have been alerted; the Balrog would not have followed after the orcs; and Gandalf would not have fallen. But for Pippinâs breach of duty by poking the skeleton, Gandalf would not have been slain. Thus, Pippinâs breach of duty was an in fact cause of Gandalfâs injuries.
But was Pippinâs breach of duty a proximate cause of Gandalfâs injuries? Here, a reasonably prudent person in Pippinâs shoes at the time of poking the skeleton would foresee combat injuries and possibly death. Because Gandalf suffered combat injuries from the Balrog up to and including death, a reasonably prudent person in Pippinâs shoes would foresee the type of harm Gandalf suffered. Therefore Pippinâs breach of duty was a proximate cause of Gandalfâs death.
Defenses
First, Pippin might argue that no one could have foreseen Gandalfâs death at the hands of a Balrog. After all, they were surprised at seeing the Balrog but knew about the danger of orcs. Therefore Pippinâs breach of duty was not a proximate cause of Gandalfâs death at the hands of a Balrog. But this argument is unlikely to prevail because proximate cause only requires foreseeability of the type of harm not the manner of harm. True, no one foresaw the manner of Gandalfâs death by a Balrog, but everyone could foresee the type of harm possibly occurring from Pippinâs breach of duty: namely, death in combat.
Second, Pippin might further argue that the Balrog and the Orcs were superceding causes of Gandalfâs injury. Superceding causes include acts of god (like freak weather) and criminal or intentional wrong-doing. Because the Balrog was an intentional wrong-doer, Pippin might argue that the Balrog was a superceding cause. But this argument is unlikely to prevail. Although it is true that criminal and intentional wrongdoing is generally unforeseeable, in special circumstances it is foreseeable, such as dangerous neighborhoods, or areas in which there are lots of criminals for example. Here, of course, the Fellowship knew it was in a dangerous area full of intentional wrongdoers, i.e., the orcs. A reasonably prudent person in the Fellowshipâs shoes could thus foresee intentional wrongdoing while in Moria if noise were created. Again, even though that intentional wrongdoing was from a Balrog (not an orc), we need only foresee the type, not the manner, of the harm done.
Third, Pippin might argue that Gandalf assumed the danger of death by Balrog because he chose to stand his ground and fight. Assumption of risk can be express or implied. Because Gandalf gave no express indication that he was staying behind but simply did so, we must analyze whether he gave implied consent to assume the risk. Implied assumption of risk asks if (1) the plaintiff actually knew of the risk, (2) the plaintiff knew of the magnitude of the risk, and (3) the plaintiff voluntarily accepted the risk. Here, Pippin would argue, Gandalf plainly knew of the risk of the Balrog because he was running from it. Second, Gandalf knew of the magnitude of the risk because he chose to stay back and allow the Fellowship to escapeâa choice that would not have been made absent knowledge that the magnitude of the risk included death to the whole Fellowship as it was trying to escape. Finally, Gandalf voluntarily accepted the risk because he chose to stay behind and fend off the Balrog. Thus, because Gandalf assumed the risk of death, Pippin is not liable for Gandalfâs injuries. But this argument is unlikely to prevail because it confuses assumption of risk before and after breach of duty. For example, if Gandalf had expressly said or implied that he assumed the risk of death by Balrog from the beginning of entering Moria, Pippinâs argument would be sound. But in fact, Gandalf and the rest of the Fellowship proceeded through Moria quietly and stealthily, suggesting that Gandalf did not consent to assume the risk of fighting a Balrog absent duress and force. Although on its face it appears Gandalf assumed the risk when he chose to stay behind, this choice was in fact under duress and by force because he would not have chosen it from the beginning but only as a last resort peril.
Damages
The plaintiff must have damages in fact and proximately resulting from the defendantâs breach of duty. Nominal damages do not count. Typically, these damages are compensatory, and are designed to compensate the plaintiff in full for the full damages caused by the defendant. These can take the form of hospital bills, property damage, or wrongful death claims from an estate. Lastly, there are also possible punitive damages, meant to punish the defendant not to compensate the plaintiffâs damages, but these are rare and are generally only awarded due to gross and wanton negligence or intentional wrongdoing.
Are there damages? Here, Gandalf was slain by the Balrog. His estate is likely filing a wrongful death claim, a serious but classic example of damages. In addition, there is a chance of punitive damages because it is possible to argue that Pippinâs negligence was gross and wanton given the obvious danger of noise resulting from poking the skeleton and the obvious danger of their environment. A jury of elves would likely be sympathetic with the estate of Gandalf because of his friendship with the elves and because of the gravity of the ensuing harm done. Thus, there is a small chance of punitive damages being awarded in addition to compensatory damages.
Conclusion
In conclusion, Pippin was negligent, and Gandalfâs estate can recover from Pippin for wrongful death.
